N+1 is not a universal label
A four-unit design requiring three is tolerant of one missing unit. Its service probability depends on unit p and independence, not the N+1 phrase alone.
Probability
Enumerate every available-unit state in an independent redundant system, classify quorum service, and reconcile system availability with expected state cost.
REDUNDANT-SYSTEM STATE SPACE
For identical independent units, the model assigns exact binomial probability to each possible count available, labels service status, and multiplies each state by its entered consequence.
LIVE DECISION RECORD
All k=0 through n states are mutually exclusive and exhaustive; cost contribution is probability times state cost.
| Available units | Missing units | State probability | Service state | State cost | Expected-cost contribution |
|---|
CURRENT CALCULATION PROCESS
P(K=k)=C(n,k)p^k(1-p)^(n-k); A_sys=sum from k=r to nP(K=k); E[C]=sum over k of P(K=k)C_k
| Symbol | Meaning and unit | Current value |
|---|---|---|
| units | Total redundant units - Identical units represented in the state table. | 4 |
| unitAvailabilityPct | Availability per unit (%) - Stable independent probability that one unit is available. | 97.5 |
| requiredUnits | Units required for service - Quorum count; cannot exceed total units. | 3 |
| costPerMissingUnit | Cost per missing unit - Degraded-service consequence for each unavailable unit. | 4000 |
| outageCost | Additional system-outage cost - Extra consequence added when available units fall below quorum. | 75000 |
Waiting for valid inputs.
WHO THIS MODEL SERVES
Primary audience: Architecture, SRE, reliability, capacity, and finance teams comparing identical-unit redundancy and quorum choices.
Decision boundary: Use for exchangeable independent units and a count-based quorum; topology, repair dynamics, and common-cause dependencies require a richer state model.
HOW TO BUILD THE STATE TABLE
REDUNDANCY FUNDAMENTALS
FORMULA AND DEFAULT SUBSTITUTION
Defaults use n=4, p=0.975, and r=3. The table computes five exact rows. For each row, missing-unit cost is (4-k) x 4,000; when k<3, 75,000 is added before multiplying by the row probability.
DEEPER OUTCOME ANALYSIS
A four-unit design requiring three is tolerant of one missing unit. Its service probability depends on unit p and independence, not the N+1 phrase alone.
Rare outage rows may have severe costs, but frequent one-unit-missing rows can contribute more expected cost when degradation is expensive.
Power, software, network, or maintenance dependencies can make multiple units fail together, invalidating the binomial gain.
WORKED ARCHITECTURE CASES
The default table distinguishes full capacity at k=4, degraded but available service at k=3, and outage at k<=2. The expected-cost column can justify whether another spare or better unit reliability deserves review.
Entering five required units for a four-unit fleet is rejected rather than returning zero availability, because the architecture definition itself is invalid and should not enter an audit record.
STATE-SPACE TERMINOLOGY
EVIDENCE RETENTION
Retain component scope, availability measurement interval, quorum test evidence, topology diagram, shared-resource inventory, degraded-service cost basis, and outage consequence approval. Record exclusions and common-cause review explicitly.
LIMITS AND EXCLUSIONS
RELIABLE SOURCES
REDUNDANCY OUTCOME FAQ
No. It starts with a per-unit availability probability and builds the distribution of simultaneous unit states under independence.
The full table prevents hidden aggregation: degraded service, full service, and outage states each retain their probability and consequence.
Service is classified available when at least the entered number of units is available, regardless of which named units they are.
Not in this binomial version. Unequal units need a Poisson-binomial or explicit state-space model.
No. It is the probability-weighted average across mutually exclusive states for the chosen exposure basis.
Do not force them into independent p values. Add shared-cause states or use a fault-tree/Markov model reviewed by a reliability specialist.
IMPORTANT ARCHITECTURE NOTE
A high calculated system availability can be false precision when units share failure modes. Use this table to expose assumptions, then test them against the real architecture.